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Abstract 
Using the concepts of epistemic virtue and vice as defined by José Medina, and 
reciprocal recognition as outlined by Glen Coulthard, I argue that the Canadian 
state is currently in a non-reciprocal relationship with Indigenous peoples as a 
result of epistemic failure on the part of the state. This failure involves a surface-
level recognition of Indigenous peoples at the same time as the manifestation of the 
epistemic vices of arrogance, laziness and closed-mindedness. The epistemic injustice 
framework alongside a critique of the politics of recognition can help shed light on 
what is going wrong between the settler state and Indigenous peoples. Moreover, by 
appealing to grounded normativity, an Indigenous ethical framework, I argue that 
a land-based ethics of reciprocity can help us move toward reciprocal recognition 
and equality, if we are epistemically humble, curious and open-minded to it. 
Glen Coulthard argues that the relationship between the Canadian 
state and Indigenous peoples is one of non-reciprocal recognition. 
Drawing from the literature on epistemic injustice, in particular José 
Medina’s notions of epistemic virtue and vice, I argue that this non-
reciprocal recognition involves an epistemic failure by the current 
Canadian state. Finally, I argue that the Canadian state must expand 
its concept of recognition to involve epistemic virtue to achieve a 
relationship of reciprocal recognition and reconciliation. My paper is 
divided into three main sections: in section one I argue that 
Coulthard is describing a form of non-reciprocal recognition that is 
______________ 
* L’auteure est étudiante à la maîtrise en philosophie (Université McGill). 
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distinct from lack of recognition or misrecognition; I call this third 
form of recognition surface-level recognition. I connect this surface-level 
recognition to the framework of epistemic injustice through the 
works of Rebecca Tsosie, Kristie Dotson and Linda Martín Alcoff. In 
section two I explain the notion of epistemic vice, as described by 
Medina, and argue that the current recognition of Indigenous groups 
by the Canadian state is non-reciprocal precisely because it manifests 
these vices. In section three I explain the notion of grounded 
normativity, an Indigenous land-based ethical framework described 
by Coulthard and use Medina’s concept of epistemic virtue to link 
grounded normativity to reciprocal recognition. I argue that this land-
based ethics of reciprocity can help us move toward reciprocal 
recognition and equality, if we are epistemically humble, curious and 
open-minded to it.  
First, it is important to clarify the idea of the ‘state’ to which I will 
refer throughout this paper, specifically with regard to the 
relationship between the state and its individual office-bearers and 
citizens. The social ontology literature on collective agents is not in 
agreement on whether complex collective actors such as states can 
have agency, group intentions or a unified self-understanding.1 I 
remain neutral on the issue of whether the state constitutes a group 
agent, and instead proceed with the claim that epistemic vices of the 
‘state’ correspond to the epistemic vices of the individuals who make 
up and represent the state (i.e. office-bearers). In other words, 
individual office-bearers are representatives of the state and can 
exhibit epistemic vices and/or virtues. If the office-bearers exhibit 
vice, especially if a vice is widespread among office-bearers, I 
understand the state to exhibit that vice. 
1. Recognition and Reciprocity 
The politics of recognition refers to the theory that justice in 
contemporary politics is largely shaped by the need or demand for 
recognition by groups. It is concerned with the way our personal 
identities are dependent on dialogical relations with others and with 
the way equal recognition in public spheres affects legal and political 
______________ 
1 E.g. Epstein, B. (2015), The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social 
Sciences; and Tollefsen, D. (2015), Groups as Agents. 
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rights and benefits.2 Most commonly, the politics of recognition is 
used to illuminate and justify the demands of social/political 
movements, as well as understand the oppressive conditions these 
movements are up against. The end goal of the politics of recognition 
is not a difference-blind society. Instead, it strives to recognize, 
maintain and cherish difference forever.3 This is because our 
identities are understood to be partly shaped by recognition. 
Recognition is a way of framing interpersonal relations through 
people’s normative and psychological status to one another. It is an 
attitude held by someone in the public realm, often by a political or 
some other authoritative institution, which is meant to recognize the 
particularity of a social group and its group-based rights. 
There are two types of harmful relations within the politics of 
recognition: (i) lack of recognition and (ii) misrecognition. Both the 
absence of recognition and misrecognition can distort a person or 
groups’ identity in the eyes of others as well as for themselves. To 
deny recognition to a person or group is to thwart their desire for 
authenticity and ability for self-esteem. Misrecognition, particularly by 
an authoritative institution, deforms a groups’ identity, thereby 
“saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred”.4 In cultivating an 
attitude toward others, the balance of power between groups is 
unsurprisingly relevant. Reciprocity plays an important role in 
determining whether recognition satisfies the demands of oppressed 
peoples.  
Yellowknives Dene5 and political theorist Glen Coulthard’s book 
Red Skin, White Masks offers a detailed critique of the current politics 
of recognition which exposes the ways in which the recognition 
offered to Indigenous groups in Canada is non-reciprocal. He argues 
that colonial relations of power do not “depend solely on the exercise 
of state violence, [their] reproduction instead rests on the ability to 
entice Indigenous peoples to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, 
with the profoundly asymmetrical and nonreciprocal forms of recognition 
______________ 
2 Taylor, C. (1994), « The Politics of Recognition », p. 34. 
3 Ibid., p. 40. 
4 Ibid., p. 26. 
5 Yellowknives Dene, or T’atsaot’ine, are a band of the Athapaskan-speaking 
Dene, one of five main groups of the Akaitcho Dene First Nation of the 
Northwest Territories.  
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either imposed on or granted to them by the settler state and 
society”.6 Coulthard includes nonrecognition and misrecognition 
under the concept of non-reciprocal recognition. This makes sense as 
the failure to recognize a group is a failure to grant them a “vital 
human need” in an other-dependent world.7 Misrecognition is non-
reciprocal in that it imprisons the misrecognized in a “distorted 
relation-to-self”.8 While these non-reciprocal forms of recognition are 
an important area to explore in the politics of recognition, I am here 
interested in another kind.  
The form of non-reciprocal recognition of oppressed groups 
described by Coulthard does not correspond to failure to recognize. 
It does not obviously misrecognize either. Instead, this form of 
recognition grants (or imposes) a kind of formal surface-level recognition 
to oppressed peoples without sufficiently acknowledging the 
historical and structural injustices that perpetuate that groups’ 
position in the social hierarchy. In the Canadian context, this involves 
the cultural recognition of Indigenous peoples (e.g. by granting 
certain cultural rights via self-government and land claim packages) 
while maintaining the generative structures of colonialist, racist, and 
patriarchal state power over Indigenous peoples and land.9 It also 
involves the revision of historical injustice to create a sharp divide 
between past events and present structures. In other words, surface-
level recognition involves “largely symbolic gestures of political 
inclusion and recognition” for the purposes of containing Indigenous 
political assertiveness.10 When non-reciprocal and awash with 
epistemic vice, recognition can create and preserve the illusion of 
equality without altering the hierarchical relation between those being 
recognized. It offers formal recognition while remaining non-
reciprocally dependent on the resources of the oppressed, offering 
little to nothing in return. I argue that surface-level recognition results 
from the epistemic failures of a colonial state. 
______________ 
6 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 25. 
7 Taylor, C. « The Politics of Recognition », p. 26. 
8 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 30. 
9 Ibid., p. 35. 
10 Ibid., p. 163. 
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Recognition without reciprocity is and will continue to be shallow 
and epistemically vicious. This is because reciprocity is necessary for 
equal social relations, structures, and patterns. Consider, for example, 
the importance of reciprocity in linguistic communication. Kristie 
Dotson takes up Jennifer Hornsby’s model of a ‘successful linguistic 
exchange’ to highlight relations of dependence between speakers and 
audiences (in a racially-hierarchical society), and the related need for 
reciprocity. Hornsby writes: 
I give the name “reciprocity” to the condition that 
provides for the particular way in which successful 
illocutionary acts can be performed. When there is 
reciprocity among people, they recognize one another’s 
speech as it is meant to be taken: An audience who 
participates reciprocally does not merely (1) understand the 
speaker’s words but also, in (2) taking the words as they are 
meant to be taken, satisfies a condition for the speaker’s 
having done the communicative thing she intended.11 
Reciprocity is vital here because of the other-dependent nature of 
linguistic exchange. Speakers depend upon audiences for uptake and 
participation in order to be understood and successfully recognized as 
knowers. Dotson connects this to the silencing faced by oppressed 
peoples, in that “to communicate we all need an audience willing and 
capable of hearing us. The extent to which entire populations of people 
can be denied this kind of linguistic reciprocation as a matter of 
course institutes epistemic violence”.12 Dotson’s work on epistemic 
violence, including but not limited to her work on linguistic 
asymmetry, is crucial for theorizing the epistemic dimensions of 
oppression.  
Dotson’s analysis of the need for reciprocity is useful because 
linguistic exchange will always involve other-dependence; a speaker 
will always depend on their audience for uptake. Recognition of a 
______________ 
11 Hornsby, J. (1995), « Disempowered speech », p. 134, quoted in Dotson, 
K. (2011), « Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing », 
p. 237. 
12 Dotson, K. (2011), « Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of 
Silencing », p. 228. 
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social group and its group-based rights will also always involve other-
dependence. In a hierarchical society this will involve those lower on 
the hierarchy depending on the recognition of those hierarchically 
above them. In a free and equal society this will involve everyone 
depending on everyone else equally. The absence of hierarchical 
differentiation between classes of people is the necessary condition 
for reciprocity and equality. In a reciprocal relation, we still depend 
on the recognition of others (as does a speaker in linguistic exchange) 
but our dependence is compatible with our freedom. We are free and 
equal because we are no longer controlled or silenced by the other.  
As it currently stands, other-dependence works against oppressed 
groups. For example, in a hierarchical society built upon the legacy 
and structures of colonialism, stereotypes about a group facilitate a 
recurring failure by privileged groups to reciprocate oppressed 
people’s attempts at exchanges. Indigenous peoples were, historically, 
stereotyped as “‘too savage’ to merit legal rights or to engage in a 
reasoned discourse about the nature of their rights”, which meant 
that they “lost the authority to interpret their own history and culture, 
as well as their authority to protect themselves from further 
appropriation”.13 This is an instance of the hierarchically privileged 
denying recognition to those positioned lower in the social hierarchy 
(a hierarchy which is a result of imperialism, colonialism and violent 
racism). The issue is complicated by the fact that Indigenous groups 
have now been granted formal recognition from the Canadian state, 
and yet the colonial history continues to harm Indigenous peoples 
“because the legal and policy structures that determine their 
contemporary rights, as well as their ability to gain redress for historic 
wrongs, are built on a model that disregards indigenous values and 
excludes them from full participation in the social and epistemic 
practices of dominant culture”.14 Indigenous peoples are still forced 
to depend on the recognition of the state, whereas the state is not 
dependent on (or even interested in) them. In other words, formal 
recognition does not guarantee reciprocal recognition. 
For Linda Martín Alcoff, reciprocal intersubjective 
interdependence must involve a “recognition of an irreducible 
______________ 
13 Tsosie, R. (2017), « Indigenous Peoples, Anthropology, and the Legacy of 
Epistemic Injustice », pp. 357-358. 
14 Ibid., p. 359. 
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difference, a difference that […] would maintain the Other’s own 
point of departure, the Other’s own space of autonomous judgment, 
and thus the possibility for a truly reciprocal recognition of full 
subjectivity”.15 Freedom through reciprocal interdependence will 
recognize, preserve and celebrate difference, while leaving space for 
those whose different ways of life have been harmed or destroyed to 
re-establish their autonomy. In Coulthard’s words, “true equality will 
allow for the colonized to re-establish themselves as self-determining: 
as creators of the terms, values, and conditions by which they are to 
be recognized”.16 Reciprocity is a necessary condition for this true 
equality. 
Coulthard is rightly concerned with the hierarchical other-
dependence present in Canada’s relationship to its Indigenous 
communities. He argues that insofar as the hierarchical relationship is 
not threatened, the recognition is not reciprocal. The non-reciprocal 
recognition offered by the Canadian state essentially offers nothing 
because, as Fanon argues in response to Hegel, those in power do not 
need recognition from the oppressed.17 What they need is their labor 
and resources: 
In relations of domination that exist between nation-states 
and the sub-state national groups that they “incorporate” 
into their territorial and jurisdictional boundaries, there is 
no mutual dependency in terms of a need or desire for 
recognition. In these contexts, the “master” – that is, the 
colonial state and state society – does not require 
recognition from the previously self-determining 
communities upon which its territorial, economic and 
social infrastructure is constituted. What it needs is land, 
labor, and resources.18 
This results in a ‘domestication’ of the terms of recognition so 
that they do not challenge the colonial foundation which is the basis 
______________ 
15 Alcoff, L. (2006), Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, p. 218. 
16 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 39. 
17 Fanon, F. (1991), Black Skin, White Masks, p. 220. 
18 Ibid., p. 40. 
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of the relationship. So long as the legal, political and economic 
framework of the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples 
and the settler state of Canada remain unaffected, the state is willing 
to negotiate, grant and impose cultural recognition of Indigeneity. 
From the side of the state, recognition will involve an 
institutionalized accommodation of cultural difference which is 
always reconcilable with colonial sovereignty and capitalist market 
economy.19 For this reason, Coulthard understands the current non-
reciprocal relationship to be characteristic of relations between 
colonial master and colonized. He is pessimistic about the possibility 
of true reciprocal recognition which goes beyond the surface-level. 
While I agree that the relationship between colonizer and colonized 
(which characterizes the relationship between Canada and Indigenous 
peoples) cannot be truly reciprocal without radical compromise on 
the side of the state, I am optimistic that the discourse on epistemic 
virtue and vice can point us to the kinds of recognition which are 
merely surface-level and the kinds which are potentially more 
reciprocal.  
2. Epistemic Vice and Non-Reciprocal Recognition 
To understand what is going wrong in instances of non-reciprocal 
recognition, beyond the obvious dissatisfaction of Indigenous 
communities, it is helpful to make use of literature on epistemic vice. 
José Medina describes three epistemic vices that arise in interactions 
between “significantly different epistemic others” and create or 
sustain oppression.20 For an epistemic agent to be “significantly 
different” from oneself could mean, among other things, that the 
agent is significantly more socially and economically privileged than 
oneself (having access to information and educational opportunities, 
along with a credible voice and authority). This is not to say that 
oppression always results in epistemic disadvantage, as it may also 
involve some epistemic advantages not available to the privileged. In 
fact, Medina argues that the epistemic vices he describes as “in the 
way of knowledge” are grounded in the character of the privileged or 
______________ 
19 Fanon, F. (1991), Black Skin, White Masks, p. 66. 
20 Medina, J. (2013), Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 27. 
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powerful, as constitutive of their very social identity.21 These are vices 
of the privileged, specifically to do with their interactions with those 
who are (significantly) less privileged. Following Medina, I will use 
‘epistemic vice’ to mean “a set of corrupted attitudes and dispositions 
that get in the way of knowledge”.22 I argue that the current 
recognition of Indigenous groups by the Canadian state is non-
reciprocal precisely because it manifests these vices.  
Medina describes the vices of epistemic arrogance, epistemic laziness, 
and closed-mindedness. Epistemic arrogance is a kind of cognitive self-
indulgence or superiority often present in the cognitive psychology of 
the powerful and privileged.23 It is the indulgence in a delusion of 
“cognitive omnipotence that prevents [the state] from learning from 
others and improving”.24 In order to “rule without resistance”, the 
powerful and privileged will try to avoid knowledge which calls their 
own opinions and authority into question.25 Unsurprisingly, using 
privilege and power to safeguard one’s opinions against any resistance 
does not result in good epistemic habits. It results in the 
accumulation of distortions, oversights and stereotypes. For instance, 
by normalizing and downplaying the injustices perpetuated by the 
state against Indigenous peoples and their cultures, the state can 
(attempt to) rule without resistance. Even in acknowledging its 
wrongdoings, by positioning them in the past, the state can avoid 
addressing the ongoing issues of colonialism. It does all of this, in 
part, through an arrogance which sees no reason to listen to less 
privileged perspectives. 
Epistemic laziness is having the privilege of not knowing or not 
needing to know. This can apply to certain perspectives or entire 
domains with which the privileged and powerful do not need to 
familiarize themselves. Medina describes the domain of the 
“mechanisms of oppression that create marginalization, subjugation, 
[…] social death [and] physical extermination, such as genocide” as 
______________ 
21 Medina, J. (2013), Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, pp. 29-30. 
22 Ibid., p. 30. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 31. 
25 Ibid. 
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rendered invisible to those in positions of power.26 It is not necessary 
for their survival, as it is for the oppressed, so the privileged become 
epistemically lazy. As a result, a “habitual lack of epistemic curiosity 
atrophies one’s cognitive attitudes and dispositions. Continual 
epistemic neglect creates blinders that one allows to grow around 
one’s epistemic perspective, constraining and slanting one’s vantage 
point”.27 In short, this kind of ignorance out of luxury is detrimental 
to the epistemic perspective of the privileged. Moreover, it also harms 
those who lack the privilege and power to ignore the reality of social 
harms. For example, the government of Canada’s reluctance to and 
delay in inquiring into the systemic causes of violence against 
Indigenous women and girls, over 1200 of whom have been reported 
missing and/or murdered, has allowed the violence to continue 
without proper attention. The systemic and structural mechanisms of 
oppression which create or allow for the staggering number of 
Indigenous women and girls brutalized and lost to violence have gone 
(and in many ways still go) unnoticed by the non-Indigenous 
politicians and police in power. This helps explain why, in 2014, then-
Prime Minister Stephen Harper rejected an inquiry into the murdered 
and missing Indigenous women, saying it wasn’t “high on [the 
Canadian government’s] radar” (CBC). It is a luxury to not need to 
know what structures are facilitating violence against an entire 
community. This luxury, though, results in serious epistemic laziness 
which harms the oppressed and reinforces the ignorance of the 
privileged.  
The last epistemic vice described by Medina is closed-mindedness. 
This is when “one’s mental processing remains systematically closed 
to certain phenomena, experiences, and perspectives”.28 The result is 
an eroded epistemic trust of and ability to learn from others. A 
closed-minded person (or group of people) pathologizes the 
perception, reasoning and testimony of those whose experiences 
destabilize their own perspective. Like the other vices, it is a structural 
and systematic epistemic character flaw. For example, Medina 
describes how one can become blind to practices of social violence 
______________ 
26 Medina, J. (2013), Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 33. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 34. 
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(such as genocide or torture) “as a result of an active effort not to see, 
no matter what the evidence may be; as a result of a constant 
distortion and description that leads the subject to be open only to 
the denial of the phenomenon in question”.29 In this way, Canada 
seems closed-minded toward the long-lasting legacy of the residential 
school system, instead focusing on positioning the harms in the past. 
In Coulthard’s words, the Canadian government “goes out of its way 
to fabricate a sharp divide between Canada’s unscrupulous ‘past’ and 
the unfortunate ‘legacy’ this past has produced for Indigenous people 
and communities in the present”.30 This temporal divide is a strategy 
of closed-mindedness in that it is an active effort not to see, a re-
description of the phenomenon of settler-colonialism as an event, 
rather than a structure. This avoidance strategy may not be a 
conscious decision by government officials, but there are serious 
epistemic erosions that happen when entire perspectives are 
pathologized and overlooked. In other words, the epistemic vices I 
have outlined may be more comfortable for the Canadian 
government representatives/officials but remaining ignorant will not 
lead to an equal and reciprocal relationship between the state and the 
Indigenous peoples. 
When the three vices of privileged epistemic subjects converge, 
they form what Medina calls active ignorance. Active ignorance is well 
exemplified in a now-infamous non-Indigenous Canadian politician’s 
flippant dismissal of an Indigenous reconciliation proposal. In 1975, 
the Dene Declaration, which sought a political arrangement of self-
determination and resolution of land claims, was dismissed by the 
then minister of Indian Affairs Judd Buchanan as “gobbledegook that 
a grade ten student could have written in fifteen minutes”.31 
Buchanan reacted with an arrogance about what is worthy of genuine 
consideration, a lazy neglect of those perspectives beyond his own, 
and a closed-mindedness that allowed him to dismiss the input of an 
Indigenous political organization representing the Dene people and 
their ancestors. As an actively ignorant subject, Buchanan reacted 
______________ 
29 Medina, J. (2013), Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 35. 
30 Coulthard, (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 121. 
31 Ibid., p. 69. 
Celia Edell 
 12 
with a “battery of defense mechanisms […] and can be blamed not 
just for lacking particular pieces of knowledge, but also for having 
epistemic attitudes and habits that contribute to, create and maintain 
bodies of ignorance”.32  
Having explained epistemic virtue and vice and applied it to 
understanding the relationship between the Canadian government 
and Indigenous peoples, it is clear that the current relationship is not 
reciprocal. Moreover, the presence of these epistemic vices explains 
the non-reciprocity described by Coulthard. Indigenous peoples need 
cultural, political, and economic recognition from the state in order to 
survive under the conditions of colonialism. The state does not need 
recognition from Indigenous communities, it needs their land and 
resources. A truly reciprocal relationship is the only way to equality; 
however, it is not obvious how to achieve this. The state’s attempts 
have sometimes been admirable in their goals (for instance, the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada’s (TRC) mandate to 
commemorate and educate regarding residential schools), but they fall 
short because they remain shot through with epistemic vice and 
firmly planted in the language and concepts of settler-colonialism. 
Even in attempting to correct unjust distributions of power, the state 
does not examine or correct the current forms of domination which 
give rise to these injustices.  
3. Epistemic Virtue, Reciprocal Recognition and Grounded 
Normativity 
In contrast to the non-reciprocity which characterises the colonial 
state’s current relationship with Indigenous peoples, (some) 
Indigenous communities have what Coulthard calls a ‘grounded 
normativity’, a land- or place-based ethical framework which is 
fundamentally different from the non-reciprocity resulting from 
epistemic vice. Grounded normativity is oriented around “struggles 
not only for land, but also deeply informed by what the land as a mode 
of reciprocal relationship […] ought to teach us about living our lives in 
relation to one another and our surroundings in a respectful, 
______________ 
32 Medina, J. (2013), The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 39.  
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nondominating and nonexploitative way”.33 I will now argue that this 
grounded normativity, which places reciprocity at the centre of our 
relationships to the land and to one another, is an important 
alternative perspective which requires the attention of an 
epistemically virtuous state. In this section I will use epistemic virtues 
to elaborate this notion of grounded normativity and its relation to 
reciprocity to argue that it offers a possible framework for 
reconciliation. 
To be clear, Coulthard is a member of the Dene Nation, and 
refers to his own community’s use of grounded normativity in their 
analysis of colonial dispossession. Of course, not all Indigenous 
communities will have the same ontological framework. That said, I 
believe the Dene Nation’s ethics, as presented by Coulthard, offer 
something worthy of non-Indigenous people’s curiosity and 
consideration. Through such an investigation, an epistemically 
virtuous state can learn a great deal about how to hold a reciprocal 
relationship, which, as I have argued, is necessary for equality. 
This place-based ethics, which informs the Dene Nation’s land-
claim proposals and demands for recognition, positions the land as 
“an ontological framework for understanding relationships”.34 The 
grounded normativity described by Coulthard does not understand 
land or place as a material object, even as a profoundly important or 
sacred material object. Instead, land is understood as a field of 
relationships of things to one another.35 Land is always relational; 
humans are as much a part of the land as the animals, rocks, trees, 
lakes, and so on. Just as we hold obligations to other people, we hold 
obligations to the land, animals, plants and lakes. If we meet our 
obligations, the land, animals, plants and lakes will reciprocate and 
meet their obligations to humans. This is how the Dene Nation 
survives. It is a mutually interdependent relationship between human 
and animal, plant and animal, lake and plant, and so on. This 
interdependence also includes past and future generations as well as 
other people and communities. We are inseparable from the 
______________ 
33 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 60. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 61. 
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expansive system of interdependent relations. Coulthard calls this an 
“ethic of reciprocity”.36  
I wish to argue that if the state can incorporate the notion of 
grounded normativity into its recognition of and relationship with 
Indigenous peoples, reciprocity becomes much more possible. To do 
that, epistemically virtuous attitudes will be necessary. According to 
Medina, epistemic virtue is “a character trait that constitutes an 
epistemic advantage for the individual who possesses it and for those 
who interact with him or her: roughly, a set of attitudes and 
dispositions that facilitate the acquisition and dissemination of 
knowledge”.37 Medina describes these as characteristics of oppressed 
subjects as a result of living under conditions of oppression. That 
said, he does not take these virtues to be universal features of 
oppressed subjects, nor exclusive to them. He also argues that these 
epistemic virtues are not automatic, but rather acquired. This means 
that although certain subjects tend to have access to different virtues, 
they have the possibility to learn or improve.38 This is important for 
my purposes insofar as I will argue that the state can learn to 
incorporate these virtues into it’s perspective. 
The first epistemic virtue is that of epistemic humility. Not to be 
confused with an undermined confidence, humility is to have a 
“humble and self-questioning attitude toward one’s cognitive 
repertoire”.39 which allows one to identify cognitive gaps that need 
filling. As the opposite of the epistemic vice of arrogance, epistemic 
humility entails not taking one’s own beliefs and perspective as 
beyond investigation or doubt. It is allowing oneself to qualify and 
______________ 
36 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 62. 
37 Medina, J. (2013), The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 30. 
38 This relates to Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr.’s account of willful hermeneutical ignorance 
which she takes to be maintained by a refusal to acknowledge developed 
epistemic resources. Pohlhaus articulates the ability to acquire better 
epistemic habits in order to reveal what is not obvious from where one is 
situated (Pohlhaus Jr., G. (2012), « Relational Knowing and Epistemic 
Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance », p. 732). 
39 Medina, J. (2013), The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 43. 
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question one’s beliefs. If the government of Canada were to cultivate 
this kind of humility, it may realize the cognitive deficits within its 
own perspective. The state may be able to recognize that 
reconciliation cannot be forced from one side, but rather, it requires 
reciprocity and dialogue. It requires government officials to have 
some degree of doubt that they have all the answers, so that they can 
turn to Indigenous perspectives to fill the epistemic gaps. I suggest 
the notion of grounded normativity as a starting-point for filling 
those gaps. What non-Indigenous Canadians may not know about 
reciprocal relationships can be learned through this ethical 
framework, if we are humble enough to question our own 
perspectives. Institutionally, the state can, for example, establish and 
maintain equitable representation of Indigenous voices in policy 
development, funding, and service delivery, including Indigenous 
2SLGBTQ people and youth, and inclusive of diverse Indigenous 
cultural backgrounds. This would be a tangible step toward making 
the state aware of the epistemic gaps that exist and begin working 
toward filling them through interdependent and equitable 
hermeneutical resources. 
Closely related to this is the second epistemic virtue, 
curiosity/diligence. A subject who recognizes what they do not know 
is also able to cultivate intellectual curiosity that motivates them to fill 
in their cognitive lacunas. Medina argues that it may be very difficult 
for the oppressed to fill these gaps because “social arrangements and 
circumstances get in the way of these subjects doing the requisite 
work to achieve knowledge: in some cases because they may not have 
the time or opportunity; in other cases because they may be 
forbidden from doing so”.40 I emphasize this because for a privileged 
subject (or group of subjects) such as the federal government, these 
obstacles are not a significant hindrance. The state cannot use 
circumstance, time, or opportunity as an excuse not to learn and fill 
the gaps of their knowledge. If they are properly motivated, the state 
has the resources. Indigenous communities have been offering their 
perspective for years, it is up to the state to cultivate curiosity about 
what they are offering. For example, the Dene Nation has offered 
several proposals, agreements, and land claims to the Canadian 
______________ 
40 Medina, J. (2013), The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination. 
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government informed by the ethic of reciprocity.41 The state has yet 
to show genuine curiosity regarding this ethical framework and how it 
might improve the relationship between them and Indigenous 
communities. 
The final epistemic virtue outlined by Medina is open-mindedness. 
For oppressed people, it is often an unwritten requirement of 
surviving an oppressive condition that they see reality through the 
eyes of those in certain social positions. They “have no option but to 
acknowledge, respect, and (to some extent) inhabit alternative 
perspectives, in particular the perspective of the dominant other(s)”.42 
This “double consciousness” (a concept in race theory first coined by 
Du Bois) is likely not something that the privileged and powerful can 
simply choose to take on. The federal government certainly cannot just 
decide to inhabit an alternative perspective, especially one that is 
starkly anti-colonialist. However, there are ways that the state can 
acknowledge and respect alternative perspectives. In some ways, the 
TRC attempts to do this by researching, documenting and preserving 
the testimonies and experiences of residential school survivors. 
However, it is not so easy for the powerful to reverse their vision to 
see through the eyes of an oppressed social position. As a result, the 
TRC “temporally situates the harms of settler-colonialism in the past 
and focuses the bulk of its reconciliatory efforts on repairing the 
injurious legacy left in the wake of this history. Indigenous subjects 
are the primary object of repair, not the colonial relationship”.43 I 
raise this issue not to argue that it is impossible for the state and other 
privileged persons to truly acknowledge and respect alternative 
______________ 
41 Since forming the organization in 1969, the Dene Nation (formerly called 
the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories) has made a consistent 
effort to negotiate the relationship between the Dene people and the 
Canadian state. To this day, the Dene Nation is engaged in programs 
advocating for Dene health, education, community development, legal 
issues, land and resource development and communications. Its advocacy is 
fundamentally informed by the framework of grounded normativity 
described by Coulthard, a member of the Dene First Nation (Coulthard, G. 
(2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, p. 65). 
42 Medina, J. (2013), The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 44. 
43 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 127. 
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perspectives, but rather, that it will necessarily involve a departure 
from their existing point of view. For the federal government, it will 
involve a departure from their settler-colonialist values in order to 
recognize what was harmed in the process of colonization. In 
contrast to how the state often articulates reconciliation, it is not just 
Indigenous subjects who need our attention, it is the state’s 
relationship to them that is the primary object in need of repair. For 
example, the recent Final Report from the National Inquiry into the 
Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls names Canada’s 
past and current colonial policies, actions, and inactions toward 
Indigenous peoples as genocide. The Final Report demands the swift 
implementation of their 231 calls for justice as steps to end and 
redress this genocide. The obligation of the state goes beyond 
repairing the effects of past residential schools, it requires addressing 
the perennial violence against and oppression of Indigenous peoples 
in current Canadian society. To recognize and understand these 
colonial practices, policies, and omissions as genocidal may require an 
open-mindedness toward alternative perspectives regarding the 
ongoing harms perpetrated by the state. The work put into this Final 
Report, including testimony from family members and survivors of 
violence against Indigenous peoples, is a generous act of offering the 
perspective and reality of Indigenous experiences and oppression. 
The Canadian state must be open to it if we are to move forward 
toward reciprocity. 
Just as active ignorance is the converging point of all three 
epistemic vices, there is a convergence of all three epistemic virtues. 
Medina calls this subversive lucidity.44 Subversive lucidity means “having 
the potential to question widely held assumptions and prejudices, to 
see things afresh and redirect our perceptual habits, to find a way out 
or an alternative to epistemic blind alleys, and so on”.45 In terms of 
the state, this will mean questioning their own approaches to 
reconciliation, their appropriation of the terms of recognition, being 
open to new perspectives that might challenge them, and seeing the 
possibility for reciprocal and equal interdependence. Obviously, this 
lucidity will not happen overnight. In fact, there are good reasons for 
______________ 
44 Medina, J. (2013), The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, p. 44. 
45 Ibid., p. 45. 
Celia Edell 
 18 
Coulthard’s pessimism about the politics of recognition in general. 
Rather than arguing for the practical possibility of this truly reciprocal 
recognition and relationship, I have argued that epistemic virtue is the 
best way forward toward something like it. Without the state 
incorporating epistemic virtue into their practice and recognition, 
there is no chance of real understanding, let alone reconciliation. 
Epistemic virtue, then, offers valuable tools for the federal 
government and all non-Indigenous Canadians to approach their 
relationship with Indigenous communities with less arrogance, 
laziness and closed-mindedness. Insofar as reciprocity is necessary for 
equality, Indigenous Canadians already have the concept of 
reciprocity central to their way of life. Using the framework provided 
by epistemic virtue, the state of Canada and its citizens are better 
equipped to understand and remain open to their contributions and 
ideas. 
4. Conclusion 
In their demands for recognition from the Canadian government, 
the Dene Nation seek to “protect the intricately interconnected social 
totality of a distinct mode of life; a life on/with the land that stressed 
individual autonomy, collective responsibility, nonhierarchical 
authority, communal land tenure and mutual aid, and which sustained 
[Indigenous peoples] economically, spiritually, socially and 
politically”.46 Insofar as the Dene Nation seeks a reciprocal, 
interdependent and non-hierarchical relationship with non-
Indigenous Canadians, its demands are largely consistent with the 
kind of recognition which makes equality possible; one in which there 
is no hierarchy to shame or obscure those lower down, and we are all 
equally other-dependent.  
Coulthard is clear that the goal of reconciliation should not be a 
“more accommodating, liberal regime of mutual recognition”.47 
Reciprocity is much more involved than that. A truly reciprocal 
relationship between the state and Indigenous peoples will have to 
address the structural and economic features of colonial oppression. 
______________ 
46 Quoted in Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial 
Politics of Recognition, p. 65. 
47 Ibid., p. 31. 
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It will have to address and alter the underlying power relations 
involved in the settler state’s claim to sovereignty. It will have to 
address the very nature of the state-form as a normatively appropriate 
mode of governance over Indigenous peoples. These are radical 
revisions to the recognition approach currently afforded to 
Indigenous peoples and their territories. It is not a change that will 
happen overnight, but the subversive lucidity created by the 
convergence of epistemic virtues is a condition for possibility of this 
kind of radical change. Without self-reflection, self-questioning, and 
curiosity, the prospect of stepping away from colonialist values is 
seriously diminished. As Taiaiake Alfred argues, the goal must be a 
‘deep interconnection’ between human beings and other elements of 
creation.48 The land-based ethic of reciprocity is just that, and 
alongside the cultivation of epistemic virtues, can lead the Canadian 
state toward addressing the generative structures which brought 
about unequal recognition, rather than focusing on fixing only their 
effects.  
In order to achieve a reciprocal and equal relationship which 
allows for truly mutual and interdependent self-determination for all, 
epistemic virtues are absolutely necessary on the part of the 
privileged. The Canadian state cannot continue to appropriate the 
terms of recognition to maintain economic and political control over 
the group that they are “recognizing”. In order for the relationship to 
improve, the state must be epistemically humble about their 
knowledge of the situation and how it might be improved. The state 
must be intellectually curious and use their time, opportunities and 
resources to do the requisite work and achieve the relevant 
knowledge. I have argued that a good place to start is the place-based 
ethics of grounded normativity offered by the Dene Nation. Finally, 
the state must be open-minded to the perspectives of others. This 
includes the way of life described by and about the Dene Nation, as 
well as the other Indigenous communities offering their perspective 
on reconciliation and recognition.  
This paper has argued that in order to achieve a reciprocal 
relationship between the Canadian state and Indigenous communities 
in Canada, the concept of recognition must be connected to 
______________ 
48 Coulthard, G. (2014), Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition, p. 35. 
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reciprocity and epistemic virtue. The current demand for recognition 
by Indigenous peoples is being met with epistemically vicious 
attitudes on the part of the state, quelling any chance for reciprocity 
between them. I have argued that reciprocal recognition, which is 
sought by Coulthard and supported by Dotson, Tsosie, and Alcoff is 
only possible through epistemic virtue. By adopting epistemically 
virtuous attitudes and dispositions, the Canadian state might be more 
able to understand and adopt the framework of grounded normativity 
offered by the Dene nation. 
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